INTRODUCTION
We introduced the concepts of strategic entropy for repeated games in Ž . Neyman and Okada 1999 for the purpose of studying some strategic complexity issues involving finite automata and bounded recall. Specifin Ž Ž .. cally, we considered the repeated game G c n , the n-fold repetition of a two-person zero-sum stage game G, where player 1, the maximizer, is Ž . restricted to strategies of complexity at most c n , a function of n, while Ž . player 2 is unrestricted. The complexity of a pure strategy is either the minimum number of states of an automaton or the minimum length of recall required to implement the strategy. Our interest was in how the value of such a game depends on the complexity bound, and, in particular, the relationship between the number of repetitions and the complexity bound so that the unrestricted player can take advantage of the other player's strategic limitation. Mathematical formulation of the problem is n Ž Ž .. n Ž Ž .. the asymptotics of the value of G c n , denoted by V c n , under Ž . some condition on the order of magnitude of c n . The work thus follows the line of research dealing with models of repeated games with exoge-Ž . nously given strategic complexity bound, e.g., Ben-Porath 1993 , Neyman Ž . Ž .Ž 1985 , 1997 , 1999 , Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1994 , 1998 finite . Ž .Ž . automata , and Lehrer 1988 Lehrer , 1994 Ž . where U# G is the maximin value in pure actions of the stage game G.
Ž . The key observation leading to the proof of 1 is that the number of pure strategies, up to the equivalence, implementable by automata of size Ž .
OŽ m.
number of states m is of the order m . Thus any probability distribution, i.e., mixed strategy, over such pure strategies has entropy at most Cm log m for some constant C. This led us to examining repeated games in which there is a direct restriction on player 1's mixed strategies in terms Ž . of strategic entropy again, there is no restriction on player 2's strategies . Strategic entropy of a mixed strategy is the maximum entropy of the play generated by that strategy where the maximum is taken over the other player's pure strategies. We showed that if the strategic entropy bound Ž . Ž Ž . . 1 n satisfies the condition lim n rn s 0, then the maxmin value nªϱ n Ž Ž .. Ž . of the repeated game G n converges to U# G . We also showed that strategic entropy of a mixed strategy never exceeds its entropy. Hence the Ž . Ž condition on the left-hand side of 1 implies that the strategic entropy in n Ž Ž .. Ž Ž . . the automata game G c n satisfies lim n rn s 0, which, by what nªϱ n Ž Ž .. we have proved, implies that the maxmin value of G c n converges to Ž . n Ž Ž .. U# G . But the minimax theorem does apply to the game G c n , hence Ž . the right-hand side of 1 .
Above we used strategic entropy as a technical tool. However, there is a sense in which this concept is of an independent interest. Suppose that one Ž tries to encode the possible realizations of a mixed strategy or any random . variable into sequences of 0s and 1s. Entropy of the mixed strategy is then, roughly, the minimum number of bits required for this task. If one associates a unit cost to each bit used, the entropy can be considered the Ž . expected cost of randomization. The strategic entropy in this context is a measure of the cost of randomization in the play generated by the mixed strategy.
n Ž Ž .. In this paper we study the asymptotics of the minimax value, W n , n Ž Ž .. of G n under the condition that the per stage strategic entropy bound Ž . n rn converges to an arbitrary fixed nonnegative number ␥. We will n Ž Ž .. give a characterization of lim W n as a continuous function of ␥.
nªϱ
This function is derived from the underlying stage game. To be specific, we will look at the stage game in which player 1 is allowed to use mixed actions with entropy at most ␥. Then one computes the maxmin value of Ž . such a game for each ␥ G 0, and thus obtains a function U ␥ . Our main n Ž Ž .. Ž .Ž . Ž . theorem states that W n converges to cav U ␥ whenever n rn ª ␥ , where cav U is the concavification of the function U, i.e., the smallest concave function at least as large as U pointwise. We will give a similar characterization of the maxmin value of the infinitely repeated games in which there is a restriction on player 1's strategies in terms of Ž . strategic entropy rate, a concept introduced in Neyman and Okada 1998 . In the next section, the basic notations and terminologies for the stage game and the repeated games are introduced. We review information theoretic concepts in Section 3 and the concepts of strategic entropy in Section 4. Section 5 contains the main results.
2. THE STAGE GAME AND REPEATED GAMES Ž . Let G s A, B, r be a two-person zero-sum game in strategic form, where A and B are finite sets of pure actions for players 1 and 2, respectively, and r: A = B ª ‫ޒ‬ is the payoff matrix of player 1, the maximizer. A mixed action is a probability distribution on the set of pure Ž . Ž . actions. Let ⌬ A and ⌬ B be the sets of mixed actions of the two players. We denote the maxmin¨alue in pure actions and the¨alue of G by
w Ž .x and Val G s min max E r a, b . By the minimax theorem we
. Given a game G s A, B, r , we next describe a new game in which G is Ž . played repeatedly with complete information and standard signaling .
Ž . ϱ A play of a repeated game is an infinite sequence s , where
We denote the set of all plays by ⍀ , i.e., ⍀ s to A and B, respectively. Each element of S and T represents a n n Ž . ''strategy at stage n.'' For each s g S , since s depends only on n n n Ž . ϱ the first n y 1 coordinates of s , we sometimes write
. Similarly for t g T . A pure strategy of player 1 resp. 2
Thus the sets of pure strategies of the two players are S s = S and n nG 1 T s = T . We consider S and T to be endowed with the product n nG 1 topologies with the discrete topology on each factor. Denote by S S and T T the Borel -algebra of S and T, respectively. A mixed strategy of player 1 Ž . Ž .Ž Ž .. resp. 2 is then a probability on S, S S resp. T, T T . Ž . Ž . ϱ A beha¨ioral strategy of player 1 resp. 2 is a sequence
, where resp. is a measurable mapping from 
Note that s and t , being A A -measurable, are constant everywhere.
variable. The expectation operator with respect to P is denoted by E .
, ,
For each positive integer n, we define the n-average payoff function
In this paper we study two classes of repeated games:
Finitely repeated game G n with n-average payoff r . n ϱ
Ž .
Undiscounted Game G , where the payoff to player 1 from s, t is evaluated by the Cesaro limit, if it exists, of the induced sequence of stagè Ž . payoffs, i.e., lim r s, t .
nªϱ n
For the undiscounted game G ϱ , the above Cesaro limit does not necessarily exist. We will supplement this loose end by being explicit in the description of the solution concepts in Section 5.2.
For each positive integer n, two pure strategies of a player are said to be n-equivalent if, against any pure strategy of the other player, they induce n-equivalent plays. If two pure strategies induce the same play against any strategy of the other player, they are said to be equi¨alent. Extending this notion to mixed and behavioral strategies, we say that two strategies of a player are n-equivalent if, against any strategy of the other player, they Ž . induce the same probability on ⍀ , A A . The equivalence of two strategies ϱ n is similarly defined by replacing A A by A A above. Perfect recall implies that n ϱ every mixed strategy has an equivalent behavioral strategy and vice versa Ž . Kuhn's theorem .
INFORMATION THEORETIC CONCEPTS
Let X be a random variable which takes values in a finite set ⌰ and
where 0 log 0 is defined to be 0.
To fix the unit, we take the logarithm to the base 2, and we say that entropy is measured in bits. The entropy of a random variable depends only on its distribution and not on the particular values it takes. Thus we Ž . also write H p for the quantity in the above definition and regard H as a Ž . function on ⌬ ⌰ .
Entropy possesses a number of desirable properties as a measure of uncertainty of a random variable or a probability distribution.
Ž . or any random variable X with this distribution , Figure 1 shows the graph of H p which is parameterized by p . 
with the joint distribution p , , denote by p the conditional 1 2 2 1 probability that X s given X s . Define
Ž < . Thus h X is the entropy of X when the realization X s is 2 1 2 1 1 Ž < . known. Consider h X и as a random variable on ⌰ equipped with the 
Ž . An application of this equality to X , . . . , X and X yields
Ž .
Hence by induction we have the following equality.
An extension of the entropy measure to stochastic processes is called entropy rate and is defined as follows.
Ž . ϱ DEFINITION 3.3. Let X be a stochastic process where each X n ns1 n ϱ ŽŽ .. Ž . takes values in a finite set ⌰. The entropy rate H X of X is n nn s1
defined by
Thus the entropy rate is the upper limit of the average uncertainty per bit of the process. For example, for an i.i.d. process the entropy rate coincides with the entropy of the common distribution. This follows immediately from Proposition 3.2 with the i.i.d. assumption. Since
. . , X F log ⌰ by Proposition 3.1 1 , the entropy rate H X 1 k n < < is bounded by log ⌰ .
STRATEGIC ENTROPY
We are now ready to define the concepts of strategic entropy and strategic entropy rate. The following discussion focuses on player 1's strategy.
Ž . ϱ as follows. Given , t g ⌬ S = T, let X be the random play k ks1 Ž . n Ž . induced by , t . Then H : t is defined to be the entropy of this random play up to stage n, that is,
Recall that H H is the partition of ⍀ with respect to actions in the first n n ϱ n Ž . stages. Thus H : t is the uncertainty about the play up to stage n that player 2 faces when player 1 uses and player 2 uses t. We summarize n Ž . Ž . the properties of H и : и as a proposition. See Neyman and Okada 1999 for the proof.
The next lemma follows directly from Proposition 3.2.
Ž . ϱ Suppose that s is a sequence of independent mixed actions,
be the random play induced by , t .
Hence by the definition of the condi-
Lemma 4.1, we have the following lemma.
is a sequence of independent actions where
for e¨ery t g T.
Ž . For each g ⌬ S , we now define the n-strategic entropy of to be the n Ž . maximum of H : t , where the maximum is taken over all pure strategies t g T of player 2. n Ž .
Ž
n Ž . By Proposition 4.1 1 , H : и is continuous on the compact set T, and Ž . so the above maximum does exist. Alternatively, by Proposition 4.1 4 , n Ž . H : и is constant on each n-equivalence classes of T, and since there are only a finite number of the n-equivalence classes, the maximum exists. The next proposition summarizes the properties of the n-strategic entropy.
Ž .
n Ž . To conclude this section we mention an additional concept of strategic entropy. As we remarked in the Introduction, one can view the strategic entropy as a cost of randomization in repeated play. As such, the definition of the strategic entropy in Definition 4.1 has a disadvantage. Recall that n Ž . H : t is the entropy of the random play averaged over all histories. Thus it is possible that after some history with positive, but small, probability, the conditional entropy of the play for the rest of the game is quite large. The definition below would be more adequate if one wishes to bound the entropy of the play conditional on any history with a positive probability. 
Ž . PROPOSITION 4.2. 1 H is continuous as a function on
For k s 0,
Ž . 
, . . . , s Ž .
Ž . Ž . and, for n with e l -n -e l q 1 ,
See Fig. 2 . Let , . . . , be such that 1 s T for all j s 1, . . . , k. Then,
, . . . , s m, and thus
. . , X s , H X N X , . . . , X s H , 1 y , and so on. In general, we have It can be shown that if a mixed strategy has a finite support, then n Ž . < Ž .< h : t F log Supp . In particular, if is a mixture over finite aun Ž . tomata with m states, then for every n and t g T, h : t F Km log m, Ž . ϱ where K is a constant. If s is a sequence of independent n ns1 Ž . actions, i.e., for each n there is a mixed action ␣ g ⌬ A such that
In this case, for any two histo-
. . , and , . . . , , we have h X , . . . , X , . . . , s
The strategies constructed in the proofs of Theoks 1 k rems 5.1 and 5.2 are of this type.
REPEATED GAMES WITH STRATEGIC ENTROPY BOUND
n Ž . 5.1. The Finitely Repeated Game G n Ž . Given a finitely repeated game G s S, T, r , we consider a modified n version in which player 1's strategy is restricted to strategies whose n-strategic entropy does not exceed a prespecified bound. Player 2's set of n Ž . strategies will be left intact. For G 0, define ⌺ to be the subset of Ž . ⌬ S consisting of all strategies whose n-strategic entropy is at most , i.e., n Ž . Ä Ž .< n Ž . 4 n Ž . ⌺ s g ⌬ S H F . Let G be the n-fold repetition of G n Ž . in which player 1 is restricted to strategies in ⌺ while player 2's Ž . strategy set remains ⌬ T . n Ž . n Ž . The set ⌺ is in general not convex and therefore G may not have the value. Consider, for example, the one-shot game of Example 5.1 below. The subsequent discussion will focus on the maximin value of n Ž .
Thus for each g ⌬ S , r , и is continuous on the n Ž . compact set T and hence min r , t is well defined and continuous in t g T n Ž . n Ž . . Proposition 4.2 1 implies that ⌺ is compact. Therefore, the above n Ž . expression of the maxmin value of G is well defined.
We are interested in the asymptotics of this maxmin value when we Ž . allow the entropy bound to be the function of n. Let us also write n Ž Ž .. Ž . for n rn. In Neyman and Okada 1999 it has been shown that if n Ž . Ž Ž .. Ž . n ª 0 as n ª ϱ, then W n ª U# G as n ª ϱ. In other words, if the entropy bound grows more slowly than the number of repetitions, then the most player 1 can guarantee in the long run is the one-shot game maxmin payoff in pure actions. In what follows we will provide a full n Ž Ž .. Ž . characterization of the asymptotics of W n as n tends to an arbitrary nonnegative number.
Ž . In the stage game G s A, B, r , and for ␥ G 0, define 
Ž .
Thus U ␥ is what player 1 can secure in G using a mixed action of Ž . entropy at most ␥. Note that H ␣ F 0 if and only if ␣ is a pure action.
Ž . Ž . So U 0 s U# G . On the other hand, if we allow ␥ to be at least as large as the entropy of some optimal action of player 1 in G, then he can use Ž . Ž . that optimal action and achieve Val G . Let us define ␥ s min H ␣* , where the minimum is taken over all optimal actions ␣* of player 1 in G. 
Ž . Then U ␥ s Val G for every ␥ G ␥. We regard U as a function of nonnegative reals and define cav U to be its concavification, i.e., the smallest concave function which is at least as large as U at every point of its domain. Ž . , , has entropy log 2 s 1. 
To illustrate how one can obtain U, take an antropy level ␥ in Fig. 3 
concave. Figure 4 a depicts a typical case for a 2 = k game along with the Ž entropy of mixed actions. Player 1 has pure actions, say, T and B, and the Ž . . probability of choosing T is ␣ T .
Ž . To obtain the picture of U, note that we can write U ␥ s Ž . max U ␥ , where
Ž . In Fig. 4 b , the upper envelope of U and U is U. Thus the graph of U 1 2 consists of four pieces of strictly increasing convex parts and a horizontal part. In general, U is strictly increasing and piecewise convex up to ␥ and Ž . then becomes a constant, Val G , thereafter. Hence cav U is nondecreasing and piecewise linear.
Ž . ϱ Note that if X is a random play induced by a pair of strategies,
is A A -measurable. In the proof of the next
THEOREM 5.1. For e¨ery n,
Proof. First we describe player 1's strategy that guarantees him a payoff at least as large as the left-hand side of the above inequality. Since U is a continuous function defined on nonnegative reals, there exist w x ␥ G 0, ␥ G 0, and p g 0, 1 such that
See Fig. 5 . Ž . Let ␣ , i s 0, 1, be player 1's actions with H ␣ F ␥ that guarantees every k and every g ⍀ ;
w x where pn is the integer part of pn. Then, the strategic entropy of is simply the entropy of the sequence of independent random actions in w x w x which the first pn terms are ␣ 's followed by n y pn terms of ␣ 's.
1 0
Therefore, indeed has the strategic entropy within the specified bound
n Ž . where the first equality follows from the definition of H and Lemma Ž . 4.2. By playing , player 1 guarantees himself U ␥ at every stage in the 1 w x Ž . first pn rounds and then U ␥ at every stage for the rest of the game, 0 and hence for any pure strategy t of player 2, Ž .Ž . Ž . and since cav U ␥ G U ␥ for every ␥ G 0, we have
Thus by the concavity of cav U and Jensen's inequality,
Finally, we obtain
Ž . The game G ␥ , ␥ G 0, is obtained from G by restricting player 1's set ϱ Ž . Ä Ž . ϱ Ž . 4 of strategies to ⌺ ␥ s g ⌬ S N H F ␥ . Again, player 2's strategy set remains intact.
The next theorem asserts two things which are considered to be natural Ž .Ž . ϱ Ž . requirements for the payoff, cav U ␥ , to be the maxmin value of G ␥ . Ž .Ž . First, player 1 can ''guarantee'' cav U ␥ in a rather strong sense that he has such a strategy that, regardless of player 2's strategy, the expected Ž .Ž . average payoff in the first n stages is at least cav U ␥ for every n.
Second, for every strategy of player 1, player 2 has a counterstrategy that Ž .Ž . keeps player 1's payoff arbitrarily close to cav U ␥ in the long run.
ϱ Ž . THEOREM 5.2. 1 ᭚ g ⌺ ␥ such that ᭙ t g T, ᭙ n,
Proof. We verify that has strategic entropy rate at most ␥. Take t g T Ž . ϱ Ž . arbitrarily and let X be the random play induced by , t . Then by k ks1 the construction of and Lemma 4.2, we have, for every n,
